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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the U.S. Congress passed legislation enabling a U.S.-India civil
nuclear deal that would permit the United States to export nuclear materials
and equipment to India notwithstanding India's refusal to sign the Treaty on
f Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2009; Yale University, B.A. 2004. Many thanks to W.
Michael Reisman and Lon Fisler Damrosch for their comments on earlier drafts, and to Sameer Ahmed,
Zachary D. Kaufman, and The Yale Journal of International Law for their editorial assistance. The title
comes from a speech by President George W. Bush referencing his plans to change the U.S.-Russia
relationship in recognition of post-Cold War realities and his intention to move from a "nuclear balance
of terror" to an era of "common responsibilities and common interests." George W. Bush, President of
the U S., Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University (May 1,
2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010501 - I0.html.
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the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).1 Following the passage of
the Act, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh completed a bilateral "123
Agreement"' 2 to exempt India from restrictions on trade in civil nuclear
materials and place fourteen of India's twenty-two nuclear reactors, and all
civil reactors built thereafter, under International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards.3 Despite recent assurances from U.S. diplomats that "we
are 90 percent of the way there," 4 the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal has since
faltered, with dissension from within India now threatening to shut down the
deal indefinitely.5
The proposed U.S.-India deal is an integral part of the Bush
administration's approach to nonproliferation. 6 In a 2001 speech at the
National Defense University, President Bush unveiled his new policy, labeling
it "a clear and clean break from the past." The President called for a new
concept of deterrence 8 and made clear his intention to move beyond old
I. See Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-401, tit. 1, 120 Stat. 2726 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 8001-8008 and 42 U.S.C. §
2153(d)).
2. This term refers to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68
Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297g-4), which governs U.S. nuclear trade
agreements with foreign nations. To date, the United States has concluded approximately two dozen
such agreements. National Nuclear Security Administration, Agreements for Cooperation in the
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/cooperation.shtml (last visited Feb.
14, 2008).
3. R. Nicholas Bums, America's Strategic Opportunity with India, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec.
2007, at 131, 136.
4. R. Nicholas Bums, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks to
the Heritage Foundation, U.S.-India Relations: The Road Ahead (May 23, 2007), available at
http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/85424.htm.
5. See Foster Klug, US.-India Nuclear Deal's Future Uncertain, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Apr. 4, 2008, available at http://ap.google.com/article/
ALeqM5hjHnPz7XXOWpdjPiswhHLvaXjpAD8VRONLOO; Matthew Rosenberg, Nuclear Deal
Threatens India Government, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 9, 2007, available at http://abcnews.go.com/
Intemational/wireStory?id=3708805.
6. See NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 4, 6 (2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12WMDStrategy.pdf (emphasizing the
importance of "work[ing] closely with like-minded countries" to confront new proliferation threats,
"build coalitions," and "hold countries responsible for complying with their commitments" as well as
the United States's intention to "pursue country-specific strategies that best enable us and our friends
and allies to prevent, deter, and defend against WMD and missile threats from [dedicated
proliferators]"); cf THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 27 (2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (acknowledging that "[d]ifferences remain"
between the United States and India "including over the development of India's nuclear and missile
programs" but stating that "[t]hrough a strong partnership with India, we can best address any
differences and shape a dynamic future").
7. George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty
at National Defense University (May 1, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/05/20010501-10.html. The President's reference to a "clear and clean break" pertained
most directly to the United States's decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,
a decision it would announce several months later. Press Release, White House Press Sec'y, ABM
Treaty Fact Sheet: Announcement of Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (Dec. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/2001/6848.htm.
8. Bush, supra note 7 ("We must work together with other like-minded nations to deny
weapons of terror from those seeking to acquire them .... We need new concepts of deterrence that rely
on both offensive and defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear
retaliation.").
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nonproliferation frameworks and treaties that "prevent[] us from addressing
today's threats."
9
The administration's approach raises two questions. First, to the extent
that the United States continues to pursue similar policies with respect to
countries other than India, 10 what problems will it encounter? Can a model of
deterrence that is not based on the threat of reciprocal destruction survive?'
Second, it raises fundamental questions about the dynamism of international
law. While the administration proudly hails its policy as a "break from the
past," 12 critics have been quick to condemn it for the same reason. They see
the President's policies, and particularly the proposed U.S.-India deal, as a
threat to a universalist nonproliferation regime that has worked well in the
past.
This Note assesses critics' arguments that the deal serves a possibly fatal
blow to the NPT's nonproliferation norm. Part II briefly describes the deal and
its historical context. While those who have criticized the deal as a threat to
international law are undoubtedly correct that it represents an exception to the
NPT's basic bargain, I argue in Part III that the deal may not be as detrimental
to the international nonproliferation regime as some critics suggest. " The
particularity of this international agreement does not necessitate the
conclusion that it threatens the nonproliferation system. Moreover, the
argument that the deal will significantly impact other countries' nuclear
decisions is open to question. India has long occupied an exceptional place in
U.S. nuclear policy. Its status as a non-signatory to the NPT and its consistent
objections to that Treaty distinguish it from other countries. While the deal is
not perfectly crafted, the special treatment it accords to India is both
appropriate and, some might argue, necessary in light of the unique
proliferation and security problems at issue. India is a major power with
nuclear weapons, yet it remains outside of the nonproliferation system. The
deal attempts to bring India under the nonproliferation umbrella by
establishing legal obligations that prevent it from supplying nuclear materials
to other countries, as well as creating greater incentives for India to help
restrain proliferation worldwide. In conclusion, Part IV provides three
9. Id. (addressing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty specifically).
10. Although Israel and Pakistan are the only other nuclear states that did not join the NPT,
the United States is considering a somewhat similarly particularistic approach to North Korea, recently
brokenng a deal with Pyongyang-along with South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia-to disable three
nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. North Korea's Nuclear Programmes. Getting Technical, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 10, 2007, at 55. Senator Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has
suggested that the United States attempt "[t]o rein these guys inside a deal that has some transparency,"
a proposal that some Republicans criticized-much as critics have attacked the U.S.-India deal-as
rewarding a nuclear profligate by working outside of international nonproliferation frameworks. Mark
Mazzetti & William J. Broad, The Right Confronts Rice Over North Korea Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
2007, at A 10.
11. The literature on deterrence is voluminous and beyond the scope of this Note. I mean
merely to highlight that the U.S.-India agreement is premised on the notion that, in some instances,
states can best contain and deter proliferation by relying on transparency, inspection regimes, and
international agreements rather than the threat of retaliation.
12. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
13. This Note does not take a position on the advisability of the deal from a U.S. or Indian
perspective, nor does it comprehensively assess the potential advantages and costs (environmental,
economic, political, etc.) for either country. This Note merely examines the critics' arguments regarding
the deal's effect on the international nonproliferation regime.
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suggested modifications to remedy the problems the deal presents regarding
incentives, termination, and future assurances. These changes may make the
deal more effective and strengthen the international nonproliferation system.
II. ANEW SET OF THREATS: U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AND INDIA AS
A STRATEGIC PARTNER
The United States's new nonproliferation policy, of which the U.S.-India
deal is an integral part, seeks to recognize an environment in which the
primary threats to U.S. national security stem from non-state actors and the
states from which they may acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The United States has begun to look beyond international legal regimes for
solutions to these new problems.' 4 This Part will describe the deal, provide an
overview of the NPT, and discuss why the United States has turned to India as
a partner in promoting its nonproliferation policies.
A. The Terms of the Deal
In 2006, Congress carved out an exception to the U.S. Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, authorizing the President to conclude a 123 Agreement with
India despite its nuclear status.' 5 The August 2007 123 Agreement outlined
the terms of the deal, subject to approval from the IAEA, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), and the U.S. Congress. The United States and India
pledged to facilitate civil nuclear trade 16 between themselves and third-party
countries "where appropriate."' 17 The United States also assured India of its
"commitment to the reliable supply of fuel" (including by "work[ing] with
friends and allies to adjust the practices of the [NSG]" and negotiating with
the IAEA). 18 In return, India promised to place all transferred materials under
safeguards. 19 Ultimately, at least sixty-five percent of India's thermal reactors
(and perhaps as many as ninety percent) will be placed under IAEA
safeguards. 2 Nothing transferred under the Agreement may be used for
14. According to at least one unnamed U.S. official, "traditional nonproliferation has failed."
Mike Allen & Barton Gellman, Preemptive Strikes Part of U.S. Strategic Doctrine. "All Options" Open
for Countering Unconventional Arms, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2002, at A26.
15. Specifically, Congress waived the application of Section 128 and portions of Section 129
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (imposing exports controls) with regard to India. 22 U.S.C.S. §
8003(a) (LexisNexis 2006).
16. Civil nuclear trade refers to trade in nuclear and non-nuclear material, equipment, and
components to enable nuclear power generation. Nuclear power may offer a cleaner solution to India's
enormous need for power. Indeed, "[a]lmost half of India's population has no access to the electricity
grid." Somini Sengupta, Thirsting for Energy in India's Boomtowns and Beyond, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2008, at A4. Moreover, India estimates that its energy consumption will "quadruple over the next 25
years, inevitably expanding India's emissions of greenhouse gases." Id. "India's total emissions are
[currently] the fourth largest in the world." Id.
17. Agreement Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement), U.S.-India,
art. 4(1), Aug. 3, 2007 [hereinafter 123 Agreement], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/90157.pdf.
18. Id. art. 5(6)(a)-(b).
19. Id. art. 10.
20. U.S.-India Atomic Energy Cooperation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 109th Cong. 3 (2006) (statement of Condoleezza Rice, Sec'y of State) [hereinafter Rice].
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military purposes 21 or transferred to unauthorized persons. 22 While the terms
of the Agreement itself are reminiscent of those found in other 123
Agreements, India's status as a non-member of the NPT makes the deal
groundbreaking.
B. The NPT and the International Nonproliferation Regime
Since nuclear weapons were first developed, proposals for an
international nonproliferation system have vacillated between emphasizing
arms control and arms oversight. The Baruch Plan of 1946 proposed that an
international agency exercise control over atomic energy activities
worldwide. 23 When that proposal failed to receive Soviet support, President
Eisenhower floated the Atoms for Peace Plan, which, in contrast to the Baruch
Plan, proposed separate controls for civilian and military nuclear
24
applications. When the NPT came into effect fifteen years later, the idea that
civil and military nuclear materials could remain separate lay at the center of
25its promise. The NPT is, at its core, "a bargain between have and have not
states that exchanges free trade in conventional weaponry and nuclear power
for no weapons." 2 6 This bargain has, for the most part, been extremely
effective. "The number of nuclear weapons in the world has declined from a
peak of 65,000 in 1986 to roughly 27,000 today." 27 Scholars estimate that
only ten states either have or are seeking nuclear weapons. 28 In 1995,
considering the Treaty's success to date, NPT member states voted to extend
the Treaty indefinitely.
Since the passage of the NPT, the nuclear threats the United States faces
have changed considerably. Terrorist organizations, A.Q. Khan, 29 and the so-
called "axis of evil"' 30 have raised the specter of weapons falling into the
wrong hands, perhaps even with state complicity. India and, to a greater
21. 123 Agreement, supra note 17, art. 9.
22. ld. art. 7(2).
23. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, THE REGULATION
OF NUCLEAR TRADE 12 (1988). The Plan was named after its chief proponent, Bernard Baruch, President
Truman's representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Id.
24. Id. at 13-14.
25. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT] (supporting the "development of the applications of atomic energy for
peaceful purposes" while urging "cessation of the nuclear arms race" and the achievement of "nuclear
disarmament"). See generally STROBE TALBOTT, ENGAGING INDIA: DIPLOMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
BOMB 12-13 (2004) (describing the NPT's "grand bargain").
26. See Roger K. Smith, Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for
Contemporary International Relations Theory, 41 INT'L ORG. 253, 257-58 (1987).
27. JOSEPH CIRINCIONE, BOMB SCARE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 43
(2007); see George Perkovich, Bush 's Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 2.
28. See, e.g., CIRINCIONE, supra note 27, at 43.
29. During the 1980s and 1990s, A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, illicitly
sold nuclear equipment and practical information to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. See David Albright &
Corey Hinderstein, Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks, WASH. Q., Spring
2005, at 11l
30. In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush labeled North Korea, Iran, and Iraq
an "axis of evil .... seeking weapons of mass destruction." George W. Bush, President of the U.S.,
State of the Union Address 21 (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://www whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/01/20020129-11 .html.
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extent, Pakistan, are regarded as locations where terrorists might acquire
nuclear weapons. 31 In light of these new threats, the United Nations and the
United States have turned to what some scholars term an "enforcement"
model,32 by focusing on criminalizing irresponsible proliferation, facilitating
interdiction, and establishing international policing mechanisms. 33 This
enforcement model relies in large part on the cooperation of other states. The
U.S.-India deal is part of this new approach insofar as it seeks to address the
threat posed by nuclear renegade countries and non-state actors by enlisting
India as a major world power in a more inclusive international
nonproliferation coalition. The deal is also part of a new deterrence model; it
seeks to restrain proliferation and increase nuclear stability by making India's
unilateral testing moratorium part of a bilateral arrangement with the United
States, 34 requiring that India observe the export controls applicable to nuclear
weapons countries, 35 and enlisting India's support in a Fissile Material Cut
Off Treaty (FMCT).36
C. India: From Nuclear Weapons Pariah to Strategic Partner
While India has long occupied a controversial place in the international
nonproliferation system-or rather, outside of it-the United States and India
have partnered in these efforts because of what the two countries view as a
convergence of their strategic interests.
Since Indian independence, nuclear power has been central to India's
national identity-both internally, as a symbol of swadeshi (self-reliance), and
externally, as a marker of India's geopolitical independence. 37 Yet India has
historically deemphasized the use of nuclear weapons as a tool of offensive
military force, focusing instead on the use of nuclear power in scientific and
31. See RAJESH M. BASRUR, MINIMUM DETERRENCE AND INDIA'S NUCLEAR SECURITY 129-30
(2006). Although Pakistan is generally regarded as a greater threat, considering the history of A.Q. Khan
and the insecurity of its nuclear stockpiles, see infra note 170, India has not escaped allegations that it
may have exported centrifuge enrichment technology in the past. See SHARON SQUASSONI, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., U.S. NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH INDIA 9 (2006).
32. See, e.g., Perkovich, supra note 27.
33. Examples of the enforcement model at play are the Proliferation Security Initiative, the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Container Security Initiative, and Security Council Resolution 1540. See
generally Peter van Ham & Olivia Bosch, Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Role
of Resolution 1540 and Its Implications, GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE
IMPACT OF UNSCR 1540 at 3, 5, 10-11 (Olivia Bosch & Peter van Ham eds., 2007) (describing these
initiatives and explaining that Resolution 1540, in particular, "aims not only to address the enforcement
weaknesses in the treaty and export control regimes but also to emphasize the role states are expected to
play in developing capacity and working together to pre-empt proliferation").
34. See Press Release, Government of India, Fact Sheet on the India US Civil Nuclear Energy
Cooperation (July 27, 2007), available at http://meaindia.nic.in/pressrelease/2007/07/27pr0l .htm.
35. Press Release, The White House, Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (July 18, 2005) [hereinafter Joint Statement], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html.
36. Id.
37. See V.C. Trivedi, India's Approach Towards Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, in NPT: PARADOXES AND PROBLEMS 42, 44 (Anne W. Marks ed., 1975). For a
comprehensive history of India's nuclear program, see GEORGE PERKOVICH, INDIA'S NUCLEAR BOMB
(1999).
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technological developments. 38 Indeed, "Nehru made moral aversion to nuclear
weapons a dominant theme in the Indian national narrative." 39 In 1948, just
one year after independence, Prime Minister Nehru established the Indian
Atomic Energy Commission to begin developing India's civil nuclear
program. 40 Since then, India's civil nuclear program has occupied a prominent
place in national politics.
4
'
The passage of the NPT twenty years after Indian independence marked
a pivotal moment in Indian nuclear policy. India refused (and continues to
refuse) to sign the NPT on the grounds that it is discriminatory. India opposed
the Treaty for prohibiting horizontal proliferation (from states with nuclear
weapons to those without them) but not vertical proliferation (within nuclear-
weapons states). 42 Furthermore, India criticized the NPT for imposing one-
sided obligations on states without nuclear weapons.43 India's claim has
always been that the NPT does not go far enough. Indeed India has, in many
ways, been a leader in nonproliferation. An Indian diplomat active at the time
of the NPT debates noted that India was the first country to place
nonproliferation on the General Assembly agenda in 1964. 44 According to
him, India's "persistent plea [is] that the international community should
concern itself with proliferation in all its manifestations rather than with mere
dissemination.",45 India's early objections to the NPT were linked to its
concerns about being left behind in global development. "Since nuclear
technology is the technology of the future and is likely to become the most
crucial and potent instrument of economic development and social progress, it
would obviously be invidious for a greater part of the world to become wholly
dependent on a few nuclear-weapon States .... ,,46
India displayed its nuclear recalcitrance once more during the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations. Although "the genesis
of the CTBT traces to the 1954 appeal of Prime Minister Nehru . . . [that
appeal was] invoked by the . . . government of India in justification of its
refusal to participate in the treaty, which . . . India believes does not go far
38. See ASHLEY J. TELLIS, INDIA'S EMERGING NUCLEAR POSTURE: BETWEEN RECESSED
DETERRENT AND READY ARSENAL 261 (2001). Following the 1998 nuclear tests, however, Prime
Minister Vajpayee sought to portray India's nuclear weapons as an integral part of the country's national
security strategy. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
39. PERKOVICH, supra note 37, at 444. Subsequent Prime Ministers repeated this message. See
STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., THE NEAR-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES AND THE NPT 22-23
(1972).
40. HILARY SYNNO'r, THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF SOUTH ASIA'S NUCLEAR TESTS 19
(1999). See also Atomic Energy Commission, http://www.aec.gov.in (last visited Apr. 4, 2008), for
more information on the Commission and its successor, the Department of Atomic Energy.
41. See ASHOK KAPUR, POKHRAN AND BEYOND: INDIA'S NUCLEAR BEHAVIOUR 193 (2001); cf
id. at 158 (describing how, during the Shastn and Gandhi years, Indian nuclear scientists often played
important roles as political strategists).
42. SYNNoTr, supra note 40, at 22.
43. Statement by the Indian Representative (Husain) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Feb. 27, 1968), in U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 110, 114 (1968).
44. Id. at 110-11.
45. Id. at Ill.
46. id. at 113.
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enough toward the intended goal of nuclear disarmament. ' '47 Thus, at the 1996
Geneva Conference on Disarmament, "India, acting alone, blocked the
necessary consensus on submitting the draft text to the United Nations
General Assembly. 48
Despite these actions, U.S. cooperation with India on nuclear matters
began quite early. The United States promoted India's use of atomic energy
beginning in the mid-1950s.49 However, India's 1974 "peaceful" nuclear test
put a significant damper on this policy and led to the formation of the NSG
and the dawn of an era of technology export control-based policy.51 The test-
which some perceived as a direct affront to the recently adopted NPT-led
commentators to bemoan the early failure of the Treaty.52 Yet the United
States and other major powers had a muted reaction to the Indian test.53
Indeed, the United States remained engaged with India on nuclear issues,
54
though subject to greater legal constraints as a result of the passage of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. 5
Then in 1998, in what came as a surprise to U.S. intelligence agencies,
India conducted more tests. 56 Shortly thereafter, Pakistan followed with tests
of its own. In response, fourteen countries imposed sanctions.57 The United
Nations passed a Security Council Resolution condemning the tests and rulin§
out recognition of either India or Pakistan as a nuclear weapons power.
47. Lawrence Schemman, Remarks on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Nuclear Non-
Proliferation, in THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 5, 5 (Matthew
McKinzie ed., 1997).
48. Annette Schaper, The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty from a Global Perspective, in THE
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY: ISSUES AND ANSWERS, supra note 47, at 11, 13.
49. In the 1960s, the United States constructed the Tarapur nuclear power reactor outside of
Mumbai, India and agreed to provide enriched uranium fuel so long as India would relinquish the right
to acquire fuel from other sources. Victor Gilinsky, Comm'r, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm., Remarks
Before the India Council of Washington, D.C. (Feb. 5, 1980) (on file with author). Even after India's
1974 test, U.S. executive branch officials lobbied to continue supplying fuel to India's Tarapur reactors
on the grounds that, should American assistance cease, broader regional stability might be threatened by
"pan-Islamicism" and the Soviets might take the place of the United States in providing nuclear
assistance. See Letter from Robert F. Goheen, U.S. Ambassador to India, to Paul S. Sarbanes, U.S.
Senator, at 2 (Dec. 11, 1979) (on file with author).
50. India described these tests as "peaceful" in the sense that they could be used for civil
purposes, for example, to tunnel through mountains or clear large areas. PERKOVICH, supra note 37, at
82; Raju G.C. Thomas, Whither Nuclear India?, in NUCLEAR INDIA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3, 6
(D.R. SarDesai & Raju G.C. Thomas eds., 2002). See generally Nuclear Threat Initiative, Nuclear
Chronology, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/lndia/Nuclear/2296_6267.html (last visited Apr. 3,
2008) (providing a timeline of the 1974 test).
51. See William C. Potter, India and the New Look of US. Nonproliferation Policy, 12
NONPROLIFERATION REV. 343, 433 (2005).
52. lan Smart, Non-Proliferation Treaty: Status and Prospects, tn NPT: PARADOXES AND
PROBLEMS, supra note 37, at 19.
53. See CIR1NCIONE, supra note 27, at 37; Potter, supra note 51, at 433. This pattern was
repeated in 1992 after India tested the short-range Prithvi missile. See PERKOVICH, supra note 37, at 329.
54. See TALBOTT, supra note 25, at 17 (describing Kissinger's visit to India shortly after the
1974 test).
55. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 22 & 42 U.S.C.).
56. See, e.g, TALBOrT, supra note 25, at 3; Jeffrey R. Smith, CIA Missed Signs of India's
Tests, U.S. Officials Say, WASH. POST, May 13, 1998, at Al.
57. SYNNO'Tr, supra note 40, at 28-32. However, most of these sanctions were scaled back
soon thereafter. Id.
58. S.C. Res. 1172, 11, U.N. Doe. SIRES/I 172 (June 6, 1998).
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Following the nuclear tests "the Indian government called on 'all nuclear
weapons states ... to join with it in opening early negotiations for a Nuclear
Weapons Convention,' ' 59 attempting to use the test as an opportunity to assert
that it remained on the right side of history. Commentators have debated the
motivations behind India's decision to resume testing, though there is
considerable agreement that nationalist aims lay at its core. 60 There is no
question that the nuclear tests were a setback to U.S.-India relations.
61
Nevertheless, by 2005, the world had changed. When Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice visited India in March of that year, she told Prime Minister
Singh that the United States was willing to "break with long-standing
nonproliferation orthodoxy." 62 The U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal, which
President Bush and Prime Minister Singh would announce four months later,
was not, however, a stand-alone measure.
D. U.S. -India Relations: Beyond Nuclear
U.S. nuclear policy vis-d-vis India is part of a much broader program of
alignment between the two nations based on what the Bush and Singh
administrations view as shared strategic objectives in the areas of democracy,
economic growth, foreign policy towards China, military cooperation, and
terrorism.
63
First, the United States views India as a lodestar of democracy. As R.
Nicholas Bums, the former Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the State
Department, has said: "[w]e share an attachment to democracy and individual
rights founded on an instinctive mistrust of authoritarianism." 64 In fact, when
President Bush and Prime Minister Singh publicly launched the deal, they
hardly mentioned their shared nonproliferation objectives, instead
emphasizing their desire "[t]o create an international environment conducive
to promotion of democratic values." 65 Despite the United States's recent lack
59. TELLIS, supra note 38, at 24 (quoting John F. Bums, India Calls for Talks on a Treaty to
Limit All Atomic Arsenals, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1998, at A 1).
60. See, e.g., BHARAT KARNAD, NUCLEAR WEAPONS & INDIAN SECURITY: THE REALIST
FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGY 399-400 (2002); SYNNOTT, supra note 40, at 13 (explaining that it would
be "futile, and probably misleading, to single out one cause as dominant"); Amitabh Matoo, India 's
Nuclear Policy in an Anarchic World, in INDIA's NUCLEAR DETERRENT: PAKHRAN 1I AND BEYOND 9, 12-
13 (Amitabh Mattoo ed., 1999). Shortly after the May 13, 1998 tests, Prime Minister Vajpayee noted.
"Our intentions were, are, and will always be peaceful. But we do not want to cover our action with a
veil of needless ambiguity. India is now a nuclear weapons state." Prabhu Chawla, Interview with Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, INDIA TODAY, May 25, 1998, available at http://www.india-
today.com/itoday/25051998/vajint.html. In addition to nationalist aims, enhancing India's power vis-A-
vis China and Pakistan undoubtedly figured prominently in India's calculus. See PERKOVICH, supra note
37, at 438-40.
61. See Strobe Talbott, Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1999,
at 110, 110.
62. Bums, supra note 3, at 135.
63. See generally id. (discussing the convergence of Indian and U.S. strategic interests).
64. Id. at 131; see also Rice, supra note 20, at 2 (listing democracy as a "common interest[]
and shared ideal[]").
65. Joint Statement, supra note 35.
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of popularity abroad, seventy-one percent of Indians had a favorable view of
66 6Americans in 2005, among the highest of all of the countries surveyed.67
Second, there are economic incentives behind the deal-both
considerable potential gains to U.S. and Indian industry, 68 as well as broader
economic ties between the two countries. The United States is currently
"India's largest investment partner, [holding] a 13% share" of India's total• 69
foreign investments. Meanwhile, India has become an important source of
human capital for the United States70 and a ready market for U.S. goods.
71
Third, the United States views India as a strategic counterbalance to
China, and India in return, views the United States as a likeminded country
with an important stake in countering China's influence. 72 Robert Blackwill,
former U.S. Ambassador to India, has gone so far as to say that there are "'no
two [other] countries which share equally the challenge of trying to shape the
rise of Chinese power."' 73 China has indicated that it will not veto the U.S.-
India deal in the NSG, perhaps because "any adverse strategic consequences
of U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation could be counteracted through similar
support of Pakistan's civil nuclear program." 74 China has allegedly been quite
involved over the years in supporting Pakistan's nuclear program.75 The
picture with regard to China is, however, quite complex. While India and
China have often found themselves at loggerheads, and while they share a
66. Note that this number dropped fifteen percentage points in 2006. PEW RESEARCH CTR.,
AMERICA'S IMAGE SLIPS, BUT ALLIES SHARE U.S. CONCERNS OVER IRAN, HAMAS 1 (2006), available at
http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/252.pdf.
67. Id.
68. See Leonard Weiss, U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: Better Later than Sooner, 14
NONPROLIFERATION REV 429, 438 (2007) ("The deal will provide more market share for U.S. high-tech
defense sales, nuclear sales, and space-technnlogy related sales."); Carlos M. Gutierrez, U.S. Sec'y of
Commerce, Remarks to the U.S.-India High Technology Cooperation Group
(Feb. 22, 2007), available at http://www.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/SecretarySpeeches/
PROD01_002819 ("U.S. businesses are ready and well-qualified to participate in India's civil nuclear
program .... [T]he economic benefits will flow both ways between the United States and India."). But
see Fred McGoldrick, Harold Bengelsdorf & Lawrence Scheinman, The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal:
Taking Stock, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 2005, at 6, 9 ("India may continue to deal with Russia or
even buy from France. This could leave the United States in the ironic position of leading a move to ease
nuclear trade restrictions with India without deriving major commercial benefits.")
69. U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: India (Oct. 2007), http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm.
70. See Dan Frost, Personal Assistants on Call, Just Not in the Next Office, N.Y TIMES, Nov.
14, 2007, at H5
71. See, e.g., Ashutosh Varshney, India's Democratic Challenge, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr.
2007, at 93.
72. See, e.g, Swaran Singh, The China Factor in South Asia's Nuclear Deterrence, in THE
INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP: THEORIES OF DETERRENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
287, 287 (E. Sridharan ed, 2007) (describing India as a common enemy of China and Pakistan).
73. Potter, supra note 51, at 346 (citing Zlatica Hoke, U.S. and India Getting Closer Than
Ever, VOICE OF AMERICA, July 22, 2005, available at http://www.payvand.com/news/05/jul/l194.html);
see U.S.-India Atomic Energy Cooperation. Hearing on Strategic and Nonproliferation Implications
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Robert L. Gallucci, Dean,
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University) [hereinafter Gallucci], available
at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2006/GallucciTestimonyO60426.pdf.
74. CHRISTOPHER GRIFFIN, AM. ENTER. INST., CONTAINMENT WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS: BEIJING HEDGES AGAINST THE RISE OF INDIA 3 (2006), available at
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24873/pub-detail.asp.
75. See Singh, supra note 72, at 296-97.
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long history of animosity, they have recently taken several steps towards
reconciliation, including conducting joint military exercises. 76
Fourth, the United States and India view each other-at least to a limited
extent-as military partners, conducting joint air and naval exercises,
undertaking training exchanges, and working "to expand the surveillance of
suspect cargo vessels." 77 Although the United States and India developed
some military relations in the 1990s, Congressional sanctions following
India's 1998 nuclear test interrupted these efforts. 78 In 2005, as part of the
thaw in U.S.-India relations, the two countries signed a framework agreement
for the "U.S.-India Defense Relationship. 7 9
Finally, although the United States and India face different terrorist
threats (terrorist attacks within India are more frequent and are often viewed
80
as a regional, rather than an international, threat), the two countries
nevertheless share a common understanding of the exigencies of their security
81 82
challenges and have engaged in joint counterterrorism activities. This
commonality has also figured into Indian public consciousness. Pew has
reported that "[o]utside of the U.S. only two countries-India and Russia-
register majority support for the War on Terror." 83
Against this backdrop, the shared interests at the heart of the U.S.-India
deal emerge not as predominately nuclear interests but rather strategic ones.
III. THE U.S.-INDIA DEAL FROM THE STANDPOINT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Critics of the U.S.-India deal have been most vocal in emphasizing that
the deal threatens to undermine the NPT and its nonproliferation norms.
Robert Gallucci, Dean of Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, observes:
Most analysts believe that fifty years of non-proliferation policy has something to do with
explaining why the spread of nuclear technology has not led to the proliferation of
nuclear weapons .... A key part of that policy has been our support for an international
76. GRIFFIN, supra note 74, at 4. Additionally, "in December 2004 ... Chinese and Indian oil
firms made a successful joint bid for a set of fields in Canada, setting the stage for a January 2006
'Memorandum for Enhancing Cooperation in the Field of Oil and Natural Gas' that permits joint bids on
energy assets in third countries." Id. at 6.
77. Bums, supra note 3, at 141.
78. See Michael R. Chambers, US. Military Perspectives on Regional Security in South Asia,
in SOUTH ASIA IN 2020: FUTURE STRATEGIC BALANCES AND ALLIANCES 231, 235 (Michael R. Chambers
ed., 2002).
79. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense
Relationship (June 28, 2005), available at http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/ipr062805.html.
80. A 2006 State Department report notes that "[a]s in previous years, terrorists staged
hundreds of attacks on people and property in India The most prominent terronst groups were violent
extremists operating in Jammu and Kashmir; Maoists operating in the 'Naxalite belt' in eastern,
southern and central India; and ethno-linguistic nationalists in India's northeastern states." OFFICE OF
THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM
ch. 2 (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82734.htm.
81. See, e.g., Press Release, Embassy of India, Joint Statement of the India-US Joint Working
Group on Counterterrorism (July 12, 2002), available at http://www.indianembassy.org/
press-release/2002/Jul/12.htm.
82. See, e.g, Press Release, Richard Boucher, U.S Dep't of State Spokesman, U.S.-India
Counterterrorism Joint Working Group (July 18, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2002/ 1922.htm.
83. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 66.
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norm captured in the very nearly universally adhered to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
84
There can be little doubt that the proposed U.S.-India deal sets up a system of
rights and duties that parallels that of the NPT while remaining outside of it.
Yet, as I will argue in this Part, the "addition" to the NPT that the U.S.-India
deal represents is indicative of the dynamism of international law. It adapts an
old norm (nonproliferation) to an existing reality (India's de facto nuclear
status) and creates a framework to accommodate a country that remains an
outlier to a nearly universal nonproliferation regime.
85
A. Different Contracts: From the NPT to the U.S. -India Deal
Before examining the critics' arguments in greater detail, one must
understand how the terms of the U.S.-India deal are different from those of the
NPT. Under the NPT, in return for relinquishing the right to develop nuclear
weapons and submitting to full-scope safeguards, non-nuclear-weapons states
(NNWSs) receive the right to import nuclear technologies for peaceful
purposes. 86 In exchange for sharing peaceful nuclear technology and
submitting to limited-scope safeguards, nuclear-weapons states (NWSs)
receive a guarantee that non-nuclear states will not develop weapons. 87 This
binary bargain sets up a trade in symmetrical goods.
The U.S.-India deal, on the other hand, is asymmetrical. Unlike the NPT,
it is not premised primarily on the two countries' nuclear interests, but on a
more varied set of factors. In effect, the deal permits India to have the best of
both worlds-to continue to develop its military nuclear program without
being an NPT NWS and receive nuclear materials from the United States
under limited-scope safequards. In exchange for submitting to "India-specific"
limited-scope safeguards and an Additional Protocol, 8 8 India may import
nuclear and non-nuclear material and equipment for use in its civil nuclear
program. 89 In return for guaranteeing a continuous supply of fuel to India,90
the United States receives the right to sell such materials and equipment to
India and to have India's civil nuclear facilities placed under safeguards. 9' The
U.S.-India nuclear deal undercuts the promise of the NPT insofar as it gives a
country that has refused to join the NPT greater rights than it would have were
84. Gallucci, supra note 73, at 3.
85. van Ham & Bosch, supra note 33, at 16. One hundred and ninety countries have joined the
NPT. U.N. Office of Disarmament Affairs, NPT (in Chronological Order by Deposit),
http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf (follow "NPT" in the left frame, then follow "chronological
order by deposit") (last visited Apr. 15, 2008). Indeed, universality has been a goal of the NPT from the
beginning. Carlton Stoiber, The Evolution of the NPT Review Conference Final Documents, 1975-2000,
10 NONPROLIFERATION REv. 126, 130 (2003) The NPT's goal of universal adherence was specifically
reaffirmed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Id. at 144.
86. NPT, supra note 25, arts. I-V. The terms NNWS and NWS, as used in this Note, refer
specifically to nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear-weapons states party to the NPT.
87. Id.
88. 123 Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 5(6)(c), 10(2).
89. Id. art. 5.
90. Id. art. 5(6)(b)(iv).
91. Id arts. 3, 5(6)(c).
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it to accede to the Treaty, under which it could only be treated as a NNWS
under full-scope safeguards.
92
B. The Critics'Arguments in Greater Detail
While the terms of the U.S.-India deal thereby contrast those of the NPT,
critics can only speculate as to how the deal will impact the international
nonproliferation regime. For the most part, critics' arguments break down into
three categories.
First, there are critics who believe that the deal will affect third-party
countries' decisionmaking about whether to develop nuclear weapons. They
cite Brazil, South Korea, and Argentina as countries that might respond to a
U.S. deal with India by wanting special treatment of their own 93--or worse-
by abandoning their NPT pledges and developing nuclear programs in the
expectation that they will be rewarded, despite their profligacy, further down
the road.
Second, there are critics who believe the deal will erode the moral divide
between NPT members and non-members, making it more difficult for
responsible international actors to criticize and sanction the irresponsible. 94
They argue that the deal threatens to chip away at both the high moral ground
and the persuasive pull of joining the NPT's club. 95 Some of these critics
believe that universalist regimes like the NPT simply cannot be squared with
more particularistic ones.96 These critics see in the nuclear deal a slippery
slope, wherein granting one country concessions for responsible nuclear
behavior may erode the bright-line, frozen-in-time policy the NPT erected.97
In essence, these critics fear that such deals will lead countries to take the
international community's word more lightly.
Third, there are critics who focus on the danger of allowing a NWS to
broker independent bilateral deals with countries who are either outside of the
NPT or in violation of its terms, on the grounds that other countries might
follow suit.98 Underlying this fear is a broader concern that a unilateralist or
92. This is because the NPT defines a NWS as "one which has manufactured and exploded a
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967." NPT, supra note 25, art.
iX(3).
93 See, e.g., CIRINCIONE, supra note 27, at 120 (2007); Gallucci, supra note 73, at 4.
94. See, e.g., U.S.-India Atomic Energy Cooperation: Hearing on Strategic and
Nonproliferation Implications Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. 35 (2006)
(statement of Robert J. Einhom, Senior Advisor, Ctr. for Strategic and Int'l Studies) [hereinafter
Einhom] ("[T]he US.-India agreement has strengthened the case Iran can make-and is already
making-internationally and at home .... ").
95. Scholars such as Sagan have written about the NPT's norm-creation influence. Scott D.
Sagan, Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons. Three Models in Search of a Bomb, 21 INT'L SECURITY
54, 73 (1996). The Ukraine is a good example of a country that appears to have joined the NPT at least
in part because of the advantages (be they real or symbolic) of joining the nonproliferation regime,
rather than remaining "in the company of dissenters like India and Pakistan." Id. at 81-82.
96. Cf Christopher A. Ford, The Nonproliferation Bestiary: A Typology and Analysis of
Nonproliferation Regimes, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 937 (2007) (contrasting the NPT's universalist
approach with more particularistic approaches).
97. See, e.g, Potter, supra note 5 1, at 346.
98. See, e.g., U.S.-India Atomic Energy Cooperation: Hearing on Strategic and
Nonproliferation Implications Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. 3 (2006)
(statement of Gary Milholln, Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control) ("If the United
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exceptionalist approach to nonproliferation will lead to a piecemeal, rather
than an overarching and comprehensive, framework for dealing with
proliferation.99 Indeed, it may be difficult for the international community to
condemn the actions of irresponsible unilateralists while permitting those of
the responsible. China, for instance, might insist on supplying countries that
are outside of the NPT with nuclear equipment under comparably minimal or
site-specific safeguards.
100
C. Why the Deal May Not Be as Bad as It Seems
Despite the appeal of these critics' arguments, it is clear that the
international community is faced with what may amount to a legal
anachronism: while India is a de facto nuclear weapon state, it cannot be
recognized as a de jure nuclear state because the NPT defines a NWS as a
state that has "manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device prior to January 1, 1967."'l°0 Further, India does not assert
today that it would have joined the NPT as a NNWS in 1968. Quite to the
contrary, India is adamant about its right to possess and, if necessary, use
nuclear weapons. 1°2 The international community thus faces a conundrum:
how to bring India under the assurances and safeguards of the international
nonproliferation system without undercutting the very terms of that regime.
According to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, a halfway solution is the
best option: "We are clearly better off having India most of the way in rather
than all the way out.,
10 3
While Rice's pragmatic argument may not appeal to many international
legal scholars, it is worth noting that even critics of the deal, like Robert
Gallucci, argue that there is a range of possibilities for achieving
nonproliferation goals with respect to India, from total adherence to the NPT,
which he acknowledges is impossible, to an Indian ban on fissile material
production. 10 4 In allowing this possibility, Gallucci and others like him may
accept that there can be some modification of the NPT's approach with regard
to India without a complete erosion of its norms. Doggedly adhering to the
status quo for its own sake may be misguided. The dynamism of international
States decides to drop controls to help one of its friends... other supplier countries will do the same...
."1).
99. See CIRINCIONE, supra note 27, at 150 ("[P]roliferation problems cannot be solved one
country at a time .... [A] comprehensive, multidimensional approach is needed for all of the threats we
face from new nations acquiring weapons.").
100. See SQUASSONI, supra note 3 1, at 10, see also infra Subsection III.C.4.
101. NPT, supra note 25, art. IX(3).
102. See, e g., Press Release, Ministry of External Affairs, Statement by External Affairs
Minister in Parliament Relating to the Indo-US Bilateral Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (Aug.
16, 2007), available at http.//meaindia.nic.in/pressrelease/2001/08/16prO1 .htm.
103. Rice, supra note 20.
104. Gallucci, supra note 73, at 5; see also Marvin Miller & Lawrence Scheinman, Israel,
India, and Pakistan. Engaging the Non-NPT States in the Nonproliferation Regime, ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, Dec. 2003, at 15, 18-20, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/
MillerandScheinman.asp.
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law, and its focus on process rather than inflexible rules, 10 5 does not, in and of
itself, make its force any weaker.
Underlying all three of the critics' primary arguments is a fear about
creating exceptions to a system that is nearly universal and which, in its
universality, appeals to the legalistic instinct that the rule of law derives much,
if not all, of its legitimacy from its equal application. 10 6 Yet while states
should be treated as equal juridical partners when they enter into legal
arrangements (such as when they submit to the International Court of Justice's
jurisdiction or enter trade agreements), 10 7 universally applicable, one-size-fits-
all rules need not necessarily govern all of their relations outside of these
consensual legal arrangements.
Our system of international relations has, time and again, recognized
that major powers play different roles in the maintenance of public world
order. 108 Just as major powers benefit from a system in which they often write
the rules, they also disproportionately bear the costs, both because they are
frequently targets for attacks' °9 and by virtue of their investments (economic
and otherwise) in the maintenance of geopolitical stability.1 10 Even the United
Nations, whose charter states that the "[o]rganization is based on the principle
of the sovereign equality of all its Members,""' is home to a Security Council
with five permanent members. 112 Likewise, the World Bank, although
representing 185 countries, has five out of twenty-four executive directors
appointed by the five largest shareholders and a president nominated by the
United States." 
3
105. See Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2642 (1997).
106. See, eg., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
107. Indeed, sovereign equality is a foundational principle of international law, as recognized
by the United Nations Charter. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1. Chief Justice Marshall recognized, in The
Antelope, that "[n]o principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality
of nations." 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825); see also GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND
OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 25-62 (2004). See
generally EDWIN DEWITT DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1920)
(discussing the theory of sovereign equality); P.H. KOOIJMANS, THE DOCTRINE OF THE LEGAL EQUALITY
OF STATES (1964) (same).
108. See W. Michael Reisman, The United States and International Institutions, SURVIVAL,
Winter 1999, at 62, for a discussion of the United States's distinctive role in maintaining public world
order.
109. Although U.S. persons and facilities do not constitute even a high share of terrorist victims
worldwide, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM, Annex of Statistical
Information (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82739.htm, terrorist attacks in
Iraq (where forty-five percent of the terrorist attacks that occurred in 2006 took place, id.) are, in many
ways, attacks against U.S. interests, broadly defined.
110. See, e.g., JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD:
TRENDS AND CURRENT ISSUES 1 (2005) ("New spending by U.S. firms on businesses and real estate
abroad, or U.S. direct investment abroad, reached $248 billion in 2004 ... more than twice the amount
foreign firms invested in the United States .....
I l1. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1.
112. Id. art. 23, para. I.
113. World Bank, About Us, http://www.worldbank.org/ (follow "About" hyperlink; then
follow "Organization" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 3, 2008). Of course, one can criticize this distinction
given to major powers on normative grounds. Yet having five members on the Secunty Council rather
than 192 makes collective action (and subsequent monitoring of compliance) easier, particularly because
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Somewhat paradoxically, by virtue of the role they play in shaping
international legal norms, major powers' actions in supplementing, amending,
and refashioning international legal rules may have a stabilizing influence on
public world order.114 This is not simply because of the constitutive veneer
with which they endow their actions, but because this constitutive effect is, in
fact, real." 5 Rather than upsetting a universal system for arms control, the
U.S.-India deal may ultimately strengthen the nonproliferation system by
bringing a country with significant political and nuclear clout at least part way
under its tent. Where India is a leader in the nonproliferation game, it can
remain a leader, for instance, by stepping ahead of other NPT members and
signing an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Thus, while there are strong
reasons to side with the critics who believe that any particularistic, bilateral
agreement inherently undermines the universalist NPT, the damage it may
cause may not be as bad as some suggest.
1. Marginal Gains and Real Incentives
In evaluating the U.S.-India deal's impact on international legal norms,
and responding to the critics' first argument, one must first ask whether the
NPT continues to be effective, or whether its marginal gains have diminished
over the years. Despite the accession of France, China, Belarus, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Brazil to the NPT in the 1990s," 6 many, if not most
countries joined the NPT relatively early.117 As a member of the U.S. NPT
negotiating team explains, "[t]he basic purpose of the NPT was to provide
another choice . . .to establish a common nonproliferation norm that would
assure cooperating nuclear weapon 'have-not' countries that if they did not
acquire nuclear weapons, their neighbors and rivals would not do so either."
118
While the NPT served a critical purpose in creating an alternative for non-
nuclear countries, and in persuading those who wished to give up their nuclear
those countries' interests are more likely to be aligned. As Andrew Hurrell points out, in the
international security context in particular, a
vast gulf... continues to exist between the normative ambitions of international society
and the power-political structures on which effective responses will continue to depend..
• . The old foundations for the management of security, in which inequality and hierarchy
played such a central role, have been weakened but not replaced by anything more secure
or reliable.
Andrew Hurrell, Security and Inequality, in INEQUALITY, GLOBALIZATION, AND WORLD POLITICS 248,
271 (Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods eds., 1999).
114. See SIMPSON, supra note 107, at 67-68 (describing how great powers "make and remake..
international law").
115. Consider multiple historical examples in which the United States has created international
legal rules by virtue of its actions. See, e.g., Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural
Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation no. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg.
12,303 (Oct. 2, 1945).
116. Because China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, when it joined the NPT in 1992 it
did so as a NWS.
117. See U.N. Office of Disarmament Affairs, supra note 85, for a chronological list of
countries that have joined the NPT. In addition to the three depositary governments (the United States,
Soviet Union, and United Kingdom), forty other states had signed the NPT by 1970. NPT, supra note
25, 729 U.N.T.S. at 169 n. 1.
118. George Bunn, The NPT and Options for Its Extension in 1995, 1 NONPROLIFERATION REV.
52 (1994), available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/volOl/12/bunnl2.pdf.
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programs to make such renunciations publicly, 119 today the categories of
countries with and without nuclear weapons appears relatively stable. What
progress there is to be made may, therefore, occur only around the margins-
with remaining outliers like India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Iran, and
Syria. Solving the proliferation problems posed by these countries may
require a more individualized response than the NPT can provide.
The NPT's major gains may have come and gone. While the NPT
continues to play an important role in representing the international
community's core set of commitments to preventing the spread of dangerous
nuclear technology, the proposition that the U.S.-India deal would play a
major role-or even act as a tipping point-in a country's decision to initiate
(or restart) its nuclear program is simply difficult to believe.120A government
looking to mimic India's example would have to suffer international
approbation and the cost of foregoing civil nuclear imports in exchange for
uncertain benefits some fifty years down the road-precisely the kind of long-
term investment governments find difficult to make.' 21 Indeed, the consensus
view among scholars is that "states will seek to develop nuclear weapons
when they face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met
through alternative means; if they do not face such threats, they will willingly
remain non-nuclear states."' 22 Even if one rejects this view in light of the
Indian example or others, which suggest that factors like domestic politics
may weigh heavily in a country's decision whether to develop nuclear
weapons, the United States's decision to conclude a civil nuclear deal with
India is unlikely to provide enough of a catalyst to jumpstart a third-party
country's nuclear program, particularly if that country is not directly affected
by India's nuclear posture.
One country that is directly affected by India's nuclear posture is, of
course, Pakistan. Analysts disagree on the relative stability of South Asia's
nuclear dynamics. Ganguly and Hagerty, for example, tend towards the view
that "India and Pakistan have, over the last two decades, settled into a more
stable nuclear-deterrent balance" rather than a "delicate form of deterrence
that remains vulnerable to breakdown." 124 Certainly, India and Pakistan
119. See GEORGE PERKOVICH ET AL., UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE. A STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR
SECURITY 17-20 (2005).
120. But see Kurt M. Campbell & Robert J. Einhorn, Avoiding the Tipping Point: Concluding
Observations, in THE NUCLEAR TIPPING POINT: WHY STATES RECONSIDER THEIR NUCLEAR CHOICES
317, 324-25 (Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn & Mitchell B. Reiss eds., 2004) (arguing that this
kind of exceptionalism, combined with other factors, will indeed be a tipping point for near nuclear or
non-nuclear countnes).
121. See Ashton B. Carter, America's New Strategic Partner?, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2006,
at 33, 40 (highlighting the years India spent "in the penalty box, which long exacted a heavy price from
New Delhi in terms of both prestige and technology" and arguing, more generally, that although the deal
"has caused some grumbling within the NPT regime, a revolt of its members or the regime's collapse is
not likely").
122. Sagan, supra note 95, at 54, see Campbell & Einhorn, supra note 120, at 320 This is not
to suggest that scholars have not also challenged this view. Sagan, for one, argues that this approach is
"dangerously inadequate." Sagan, supra note 95, at 55; see also George Perkovich, Think Again,
FOREIGN POLICY, Autumn 1998, at 12, 12, 16.
123. See, e.g., Sagan, supra note 95, at 63.
124. SUMIT GANGULY & DEVIN T. HAGERTY, FEARFUL SYMMETRY 197 (2005).
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frequently make military decisions that provoke threats of an arms race.
125
Those who fear that the nuclear deal will catalyze a South Asian arms race
contend that supplying India uranium may allow it to divert domestic uranium
for use in its military program.1 26 Ashley Tellis argues, however, that the
U.S.-India deal will not contribute to India's nuclear weapons capabilities or
the freeing of domestic uranium for use in India's strategic program. 27 The
Hyde Act further requires that the President monitor India's uranium
production and the amount of uranium that India allocates to its military
program, so that major changes will be noted. 128 Some have suggested, as a
general matter, that "Indian accumulation of fissile material is unlikely to
fundamentally alter the nuclear decisions or capabilities of other states, while
nuclear testing and the potential spread of nuclear technologies will have far
more direct effects."' 2 9 If one accepts this argument, then the deal may be a
step forward insofar as it gives India further incentives to abstain from testing.
There can be no doubt, however, that this is an area of potential risk.
Aside from Pakistan, Japan is one NPT member whose decisionmaking
might be affected by the U.S.-India deal. According to some, Japan has
recently become concerned by indications-such as the U.S. Congress's
refusal to ratify the CTBT and slow progress towards nuclear disarmament-
"that the nonproliferation regime is eroding."' 130 Despite joining the NPT,
Japan kept its nuclear materials and continued its research in case the NPT
were to dissolve.' 3' In fact, "[u]ncertainty about the treaty was so strong at
first that Japan and other nonnuclear states insisted that they be allowed to
review and renew their membership every five years."' 32 It would be overly
simplistic, however, to suggest that a U.S.-India deal would cause Japan to
restart its nuclear program. Other U.S. actions, as well as domestic and
historical factors, would play a strong role in influencing Japan's decision.
1 33
in fact, some speculated that Japan might even endorse the deal.'34 Certainly,
the concern that countries other than Japan are still hedging their bets in case
125. For a recent example, see India Missile Test to Start Arms Race: Pakistan, REUTERS
INDIA, Feb. 27, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/newsMaps/idUSISL2952620080227.
126. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 68, at 438.
127. ASHLEY J. TELLIS, ATOMS FOR WAR: U.S.-INDIAN CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND
INDIA'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL 7 (2006), available at http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/
atomsforwarfinal4.pdf (arguing that India's domestic uranium supplies are sufficient to "sustain the
largest nuclear weapons program that can be envisaged relative to its current capabilities").
128. 22 U.S.C.S. § 8003(g)(2)(H) (LexisNexis 2006).
129. MICHAEL A. LEVI & CHARLES D. FERGUSON, U.S.-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION: A
STRATEGY FOR MOVING FORWARD 20 (2006).
130. Kurt M. Campbell & Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable, in THE
NUCLEAR TIPPING POINT, supra note 120, at 218, 240.
131. Scott D. Sagan, How to Keep the Bomb from Iran, FOREIGN AFF., Sept -Oct. 2006, at 45,
50.
132. Id.
133. See Campbell & Sunohara, supra note 130, at 241-43. Campbell argues that "[t]he
intemational circumstances would have to be extraordinarily worrisome to override the strong domestic
opposition that would no doubt follow any Japanese decision to consider formal nuclear status." Kurt M.
Campbell, Reconsidering a Nuclear Future" Why Countries Might Cross over to the Other Side, in THE
NUCLEAR TIPPING POINT, supra note 120, at 18, 28; see Mike M. Mochizuki, Japan Tests the Nuclear
Taboo, 14 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 303 (2007).
134. Masako Toki, Commentary, Will Japan Support India's Nukes?, FOREIGN POL'Y IN
FOCUS, Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4579 (noting that "former Prime Minister Abe's
recent visit to India suggests that Tokyo is ready to support the agreement").
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the NPT collapses has become less relevant since the 1995 vote to extend the
NPT indefinitely.
2. History of Nuclear Exceptions
The U.S.-India deal is not the first time the United States accorded India
special treatment, nor is it the first time that the United States and India have
entered a civil nuclear trade agreement. 135 Moreover, U.S. nuclear diplomacy
has always operated in a particularized fashion. The U.S. response to Iraq and
Libya punished those two countries severely for their WMD programs. In the
wake of Operation Iraqi Freedom, nuclear renegade countries might fear that
the United States is just as likely to attack them as it is to reward them for
having WMD programs. 136 Nor is adopting a one-size-fits-all international
nonproliferation law a guarantee of responsible nuclear behavior, as evidenced
by North Korea and Iran.137 Indeed, despite remaining an NPT member, China
engages in a "selective policy . . . to deflect criticism of its nonproliferation
behavior through partial acceptance of certain commitments while keeping
others at arms length."
'1 38
The U.S.-India deal is also not the first time the United States created
exceptions to the NPT's rule on the grounds that unique security concerns
exist. U.S. sanctions legislation even incorporates a presidential waiver in
recognition of the unique foreign policy concerns at play and the importance
of giving the executive flexibility to decide when punitive responses are
appropriate. 139 Presidents have long exercised considerable discretion in this
area. The Reagan administration, for example, declared that the "policy of
selective denial of sensitive nuclear exports will be applied less rigorously to
Euratom [European Atomic Energy Community] countries and Japan."140
President Carter conversely adopted a policy that was criticized for being "too
inflexible" with regard to trade restrictions on nuclear materials. 141
135. The United States has engaged in civilian nuclear cooperation with India before, notably
with the Tarapur reactor. See Agreement Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, U.S.-India, Oct.
25, 1963, 14 U.S.T 1484; supra note 49 and accompanying text. Even after the U.S. Nonproliferation
Act of 1978 ended the program of civilian cooperation, see McGoldrick, Bengelsdorf & Scheinman,
supra note 68, at 6, the United States and other countries continued to treat instances of irresponsible
Indian nuclear behavior with a light hand. For instance, several countries believed that the "international
community's relatively mild and short-lived reactions to the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests may
have reduced the perceived penalties for going nuclear." Campbell & Einhom, supra note 120, at 324;
see id. at 318. See TELLIS, supra note 127, at 9-10, for information on India's fuel supply agreements
with the United States, Canada, China, France, and Russia under site-specific safeguards agreements.
136. Cf Campbell & Einhom, supra note 120, at 322 (suggesting that the Bush
Administration's "muscular counterproliferation strategy" may have an indirect impact on some
countries).
137. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Nuclear Agency Says Iran Has Used New Technology, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2008, at A3 (announcing the IAEA's decision to confront Iran with evidence suggesting
it had experimented with nuclear weapon technology).
138. Zachary S. Davis, China's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policies, 35 ASIAN SURV.
587, 588 (1995).
139. See Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa-l(b)(5) (2000) (permitting the
President to exercise waiver authority following a joint resolution of Congress).
140. COMM. ON INT'L SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL, NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 239 (1985).
141. Id. at 240.
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The development of France's nuclear weapons program is a good
example of the United States's willingness to work around the NPT to achieve
its nuclear security goals. Although France's initial refusal to join the NPT
hampered U.S.-French cooperation because of Atomic Energy Act
restrictions, 142 Richard Ullman reported in a 1989 article that the United States
had been providing France secret nuclear assistance since the 1970s. 143 In
1985, the United States made its cooperation more overt, lifting legal
sanctions and concluding a formal Agreement for Cooperation on the Safety
and Security of Nuclear Activities and Installations for Mutual Defense
Purposes. 144 Since these policies ultimately led to France joining the NPT, this
special treatment may have been a success. Indeed, although France did not
join the NPT until 1992, it acted like an NPT member,14 even joining the
NSG in 1978 as one of its founding members. France originally resisted
joining the NPT "both to protect the commercial freedom of its substantial
nuclear energy industry and for symbolic reasons." 146 For a nationalist like de
Gaulle, possessing nuclear weapons was part and parcel of reestablishing
France's "grandeur." 147 The U.S. response therefore had to be tailored to
France's unique geopolitical position and its sensitivities. To the author's
knowledge, scholars have not criticized the United States's special treatment
of France as having eroded the NPT's goals or other countries' adherence to
it. Quite to the contrary, these were years during which the NPT is commonly
viewed as having been most successful at securing widespread compliance.
The French example and others confirm that "[t]he lesson to be drawn
from the history of nonproliferation is not that all states eyeing the bomb
eventually get it but that nonproliferation efforts succeed when the United
States and other global actors help satisfy whatever concerns drove a state to
want nuclear weapons in the first place."' 148 For instance, negotiations between
Iran and the EU-3 (France, Germany, and Great Britain) beginning in 2003
point to a potential role for countries to play in counterbalancing the more
rigid international nonproliferation regime by sweetening the pot, so to speak,
thereby making compliance with international rules more attractive.' The
recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iran likewise emphasizes the
important role that international pressure played in halting Iran's program in
142. Even when the Act was revised (first in 1954 and again in 1958), cooperation was still
limited primarily to U.S.-U.K. sharing because Congress required that recipients have already "'made
substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons."' AVERY GOLDSTEIN, DETERRENCE AND
SECURITY IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 192 (2000) (quoting Memorandum of Conversation, U.S. Delegation to
the Berm. Meeting, Atomic Energy Items: (1) French Request (2) Test Limitations 6 (March 21-22,
1957) (on file with The National Security Archive)).
143. Id. at 199; Richard H. Ullman, The Covert French Connection, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer
1989, at 3, 3.
144. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 142, at 199 & n.54.
145. SVERRE LODGAARD, MAKING THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME UNIVERSAL 5, available
at http'//www.wmdcommission.org/files/No7-Lodgaard%20Final.pdf.
146. Christopher Way & Karthika Sasikumar, Leaders and Laggards- When and Whv Do
Countries Sign the NPT? 31 (Research Group in Int'l Sec., Universit& de Montreal/McGill Univ.,
Working Paper No. 16, 2004), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ger003/ger03.pdf.
147. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 142, at 194.
148. Sagan, supra note 131,at47.
149. See Stephen Hadley, Nat'l Sec. Advisor, Press Briefing at the White House (Dec. 3,
2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071203-I 0.html.
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2003.150 It now seems clear that it will take more than official sanctions and
reprimands to make Iran forswear its nuclear option indefinitely. 15 1 Another
example is Egypt's decision to join the NPT, which it did only after ratifying a
peace deal with Israel that changed its national security posture.152 Similarly, a
decisive factor leading to Argentina and Brazil's accession to the NPT,
according to some accounts, was the change in their regional bilateral
relations. 153
Despite the breakdown in 2002 of the 1994 Agreed Framework with
North Korea, 154 that agreement remains an example of how bilateral
agreements may become necessary to taking action with regard to countries
that pose nuclear threats. At least the immediate effects of bilateral action with
regard to North Korea after it was caught violating the NPT-namely, that
Pyongyang halted plutonium production and allowed IAEA inspectors on site
in exchange for light-water reactors'155-point to the potential importance of
such actions.
Israel is yet another case study in the difficulty, if not impossibility, of
treating all states alike. Israel has not declared its nuclear capabilities and is
not a part of the NPT. After the United States discovered that Israel had likely
developed nuclear weapons, but that it would stick by its refusal to sign the
NPT, Israel "moved from the era of nuclear ambiguity to the era of nuclear
opacity."156 A bilateral agreement like the U.S.-India deal that recognizes
Israel as a nuclear power is therefore not likely to appeal to Israel. Addressing
Israel's nuclear weapons concerns and securing its compliance with
international nonproliferation norms may require an individualized approach.
3. The Moral Dividing Line
To address the critics' second argument, one must consider how the
U.S.-India deal may affect the moral line dividing NPT members from non-
members. In the case of India, the derogation of this moral line may not be as
bad as it first appears. George Perkovich points out that India, Pakistan, and
Israel's possession of nuclear weapons "is morally, politically, and
strategically (although not juridically) akin to that of the original five nuclear
150. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, IRAN: NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES 6
(2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/press.releases/20071203_release.pdf.
151. Indeed, "Iran is committed to the nuclear program as an assertion of national interest and
technical prowess. . . .But Tehran has in recent years shown itself open to negotiations over the
program, and ready for compromises, so long as they entail respect for the country's dignity and rights."
GARETH SMYTH, FUNDAMENTALISTS, PRAGMATISTS, AND THE RIGHTS OF THE NATION: IRANIAN POLITICS
AND NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION 22 (2006), available at http://www.tcf.org/publications/
intemationalaffairs/smyth-iran.pdf.
152. Sagan, supra note 131,at 51.
153. John R. Redick, Factors in the Decisions by Argentina and Brazil to Accept the
Nonproliferation Regime, in PULLING BACK FROM THE NUCLEAR BRINK 67, 74-75 (Barry R. Schneider
& William L. Dowdy eds., 1998).
154. Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Prospects for a World of Many Nuclear
Weapons States, in THE NUCLEAR TIPPING POINT, supra note 120, at 10.
155. Sagan, supra note 131, at 57.
156. AVNER COHEN, ISRAEL AND THE BOMB 337 (1998). By "opacity," Cohen refers to "a
situation in which the existence of a state's nuclear weapons has not been acknowledged by the state's
leaders, but in which the evidence for the weapons' existence is strong enough to influence other
nations' perceptions and actions." Id at ix.
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powers," since they never signed the NPT.'5 7 Unlike North Korea and Iran,
which have arguably failed to honor their nuclear pledges, India has stayed
true to its original word--declining to make international commitments it does
not intend to uphold. While one might argue that India's decision not to join
the NPT undermines the sacrifice of those states that did, several factors
mitigate this point. First, as noted in Section II.C, India objected to the NPT
from the beginning on the grounds that it did not go far enough in sanctioning
proliferation. Second, India's security situation (as a nonaligned state
bordering an antagonistic China, which was a nuclear weapons country but
not a member of the NPT) made it particularly difficult for India to forego its
nuclear option at that time.158 Third, among the non-nuclear states, India was
arguably one of (if not the) closest to developing a nuclear explosive device at
the time the NPT froze the number of global nuclear powers.15 9 The NPT
certainly represented less of a sacrifice for countries that had no intention of
developing nuclear programs at the time of the NPT. Perkovich's observation
points to the dissonance between the juridical and moral norms in this
regard-something India has highlighted for decades.1 60 Because the nuclear
nations had the power to pass international legislation in 1968, they enshrined
their nuclear weapons status as morally superior, while condemning identical
behavior by less powerful nations. Recognition of this moral equivalence may
argue for treating India differently both from those that chose to join the NPT
and certainly from those who have violated its terms.
16 1
4. Unilateralism & Exceptionalism
Finally, the best response to critics' arguments about unilateralism is
simply that requiring the NSG and IAEA to approve the deal sets a precedent
for ensuring that there is some international agreement regarding the
advisability of such bilateral deals in the future.
China may well seek a similar deal with Pakistan.1 62 In fact, this may
explain why China has not publicly opposed the U.S.-India deal.163 What
157. George Perkovich, Bush's Nuclear Revolution. A Regime Change in Nonproliferation,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 3.
158. See STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., supra note 39, at 17.
159. See STEPHEN PHILIP COHEN, INDIA: EMERGING POWER 158-59 (2001), STOCKHOLM INT'L
PEACE RESEARCH INST., supra note 39, at 16.
160. Strobe Talbott recounts what an acquaintance told him following the 1974 Indian nuclear
test: "'You Americans may have expropriated our deity when your scientists broke open this great secret
... but that did not give you a permanent monopoly on morality or on technology."' TALBOTT, supra
note 25, at 14.
161. Cf Ted Galen Carpenter & Charles V. Pena, Rethinking Non-Proliferation, NAT'L
INTEREST ONLINE, June 1, 2005, http://nationalinterest.org/General.aspx?id=92&id2=12164 (criticizing
the United States's "one-size-fits-all" nonproliferation policy that permits countries like Iran and North
Korea to become nuclear powers "while their more peaceful neighbors are hamstrung by the NPT from
countering those moves"); Avner Cohen & Thomas Graham, Jr., An NPTfor Non-Members, BULL.
ATOM. SCIENTISTS, May-June 2004, at 40, 44 (proposing a "form of associate membership under a
separate, free-standing agreement or protocol" for countries like Israel, India, and Pakistan that have not
violated the NPT, but instead simply refused to join it).
162. See, e.g., Michael Krepon, The US-India Nuclear Deal: Another Wrong Turn in the War
on Terror, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, Mar. 29, 2006, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=283;
GEORGE PERKOVICH, FAULTY PROMISES: THE U.S.-INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL (2005),
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PO2I .Perkovich.pdf.
Towards Common Interests and Responsibilities
assurances are there that the U.S.-India deal will not lead to proliferation by
third-party states (in particular, China) to Pakistan and other countries? The
answer lies in the NSG, which is required to approve the U.S.-India deal by
consensus.164 The NSG, therefore, could not approve a similarly structured
deal without U.S. support. Although China could draft an agreement that
bypasses NSG approval, such a move would surely meet with international
condemnation. Because China has aided Pakistan's nuclear program in the
past (allegedly providing the weapons design that A.Q. Khan later passed to• 165 ..
Libya), the real question is: will the deal drive Pakistan and China closer
than they would have been in its absence? Possibly. But the United States and
India's growing strategic alliance across sectors would drive China and
Pakistan closer in any event. To be sure, this is a valid concern about the deal.
The salient question is whether the NSG can adopt standards in its
review of the India deal that would prevent subsequent deals that would be
inadvisable from a proliferation standpoint. Commentators have focused on
whether the United States should adopt a universal set of criteria by which it
would consider civil nuclear deals with similarly situated countries, a66a
suggestion the United States has resisted unequivocally-asserting that India
is a one-time exception.' 67 Of course the question is of limited applicability,
since Israel and Pakistan are the only other nuclear countries that did not join
the NPT. Moreover, Israel does not have a civil nuclear program, though some
reports indicate that it may consider one in the future.'
68
There can be no question that the time is not ripe for a U.S.-Pakistan
deal. The A.Q. Khan revelations are but a few years old and a mark on
Pakistan's proliferation record that will be difficult to erase. 169 Pakistan's
current political instability is another significant consideration.' President
Bush has made clear to President Pervez Musharraf that Pakistan should not
expect a nuclear deal of its own.171 Nor does the United States want to bind
itself to offering Pakistan a similar deal contingent upon Pakistan's
achievement of specified benchmarks in the future. Moreover, explicitly
promulgating universal criteria might signal to non-nuclear countries that this
exception is about to become a rule, thereby threatening instability. Yet the
NSG or its member countries might well articulate the criteria they considered
163. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
164. George Bunn, U.S. -India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Final Congressional Approval
Is Conditional on Future Steps by India and Two International Organizations, LAW. ALLIANCE FOR
WORLD SECURITY, Dec. 20, 2006, http://www.cdi.org/laws/india-us- I 22006.cfm.
165. PERKOVICH, supra note 162, at 3-4; see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
166. See Einhom, supra note 94, at 42 (advocating "country-neutral" implementation).
167. See R. Nicholas Bums, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, On-The-
Record Briefing on the Status of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative and the Text of the
Bilateral Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (123 Agreement) (July 27, 2007), available at
http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/89559.htm.
168. Miles A. Pomper, Israel, Neighbors Mull Nuclear Power Programs, ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, Sept. 2007, at 38, 38-39.
169. See, e.g., Albright & Hinderstein, supra note 29, at 111-19.
170 Indeed, for the time being the United States has focused on helping Pakistan secure its
nuclear weapons. David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding
Nuclear Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, at Al.
171. Elisabeth Bumiller & Carlotta Gall, Bush Rules out a Nuclear Deal with the Pakistanis,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at A 1.
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in reaching their decision regarding whether to approve the India exception.
72
If a country like China were to propose a Pakistan deal by arguing that
Pakistan meets the same criteria as India, the United States (in vetoing the
deal in the NSG) could articulate why Pakistan does not meet the bar.
5. Inroads and Accountability
Beyond these responses to critics' concerns, there are several
independent reasons why the deal may be beneficial to the international
community. First, it puts feet on the ground and establishes a channel for
ongoing communication between India, the IAEA, and the United States.
173
"[I]magine the alternative: Without this initiative, 81 percent of India's
current power reactors-and its future power and breeder reactors-would
continue to remain outside of IAEA safeguards. The Indian nuclear power
program would remain opaque, a nuclear black box."' 174 Addressing emerging
nuclear threats (particularly nuclear terrorism) requires effective mechanisms
for securing existing stockpiles and dual-use materials as well as
strengthening cooperation with governments that possess them. While there
are legitimate concerns that the U.S.-India deal as drafted does not accomplish
this goal, since the safeguards cover only those facilities India chooses,
175
having India comply with some IAEA safeguards is certainly an improvement
from having it comply with none. 176 Because the U.S.-India deal is not an
arms control agreement (like the Nunn-Lugar program aimed at securing
nuclear stockpiles in Russia 177), there are limits to what it can accomplish. Yet
if it is true, as some experts argue, that nuclear weapons will spread no matter
what we do, 1 8 then it is particularly important that we strengthen strategic
relationships with states that possess nuclear materials. Indeed, this is a
mainstay of the United States's new approach to nonproliferation.
179
The U.S.-India deal also takes several steps towards ensuring that India
remains a responsible nuclear power. For instance, it requires that India sign
an Additional Protocol (further strengthening the IAEA's ability to collect
data on countries' nuclear activities), which only eighty-six states have
adopted to date. 180 India has also pledged to "refrai[n] from transfer of
enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them" and
to "adhere[] to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear
172. This does not mean that these reasons must be framed in universal terms. Certainly, the
NSG could approve the deal because it finds India's export regulations sufficiently strong and its
separation plan to be adequate insurance against the diversion of materials and supplies to India's
military program.
173. There are presently some IAEA safeguards in place in India, though they are quite limited.
See Weiss, supra note 68, at 439-41.
174. Rice, supra note 20, at 3.
175. "There is no reason why we should attach any positive value to India's willingness to
submit a few additional nuclear facilities of its choosing to international safeguards, so long as other
fissile material producing facilities are free from safeguards." Gallucci, supra note 73, at 2.
176. See Rice, supra note 20.
177. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5901-02 (2000).
178. See, e.g., CIRNCIONE, supra note 27, at 102.
179. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
180. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional
Protocols, http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg-protocol.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
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Suppliers Group ... guidelines."' 18 1 If the underlying purpose and philosophy
of the NPT is to permit the development of "peaceful applications-of nuclear
technology" while preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and
enhancing "the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,"', 82
then the U.S.-India deal is a step forward in accomplishing these goals.
As counterintuitive as it seems, the likelihood of future Indian nuclear
tests provides another argument in favor of the deal. Whatever agreement the
international community reaches with India, it must anticipate that India may
test again. 183 While a nuclear test automatically triggers sanctions under U.S.
law, if the past is any guide, Congress and the executive branch will find ways
to lessen the sanctions' impact. 84A bilateral nuclear agreement can, however,
institute automatic triggers, as recommended in Section IV.B. The deal also
places the United States in a position of greater responsibility for monitoring
Indian proliferation. 185 For instance, the deal makes India's unilateral
moratorium on nuclear testing bilaterally enforceable. 186 Increased U.S.
accountability for India's nuclear behavior thus permits (if not obliges) the
United States to be more vigilant in monitoring and responding to
irresponsible nuclear behavior.'
87
The international nonproliferation system has evolved over time and
must continue to do so. Less formal international coalitions, like the NSG and
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 88 have developed to complement
the NPT. With NPT members like Iran demonstrating that they are not afraid
to violate the Treaty, groups like the NSG have emerged as critical to weapons
181. Joint Statement, supra note 35.
182. NPT, supra note 25
183. Shortly after the 123 Agreement was signed, Prime Minister Singh announced to
Parliament that it should not oppose the deal since it did not restrict "'India's right to undertake future
nuclear tests, if it is necessary."' Somini Sengupta, Defending Nuclear Pact, India Premier Faces Jeers,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at A10.
184. While the Arms Export Controls Act, 22 U.S C § 2799aa-1 (2000), and the Export-Import
Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(4) (2000), require that the United States impose economic sanctions on a
non-nuclear country that receives or detonates a nuclear device, the United States has sought exceptions
for India. For instance, although the United States imposed sanctions after India's 1998 tests, most of the
U.S. sanctions were eased within a few months and Congress gave the President authority to remove all
of the sanctions the following year. DIANNE E. RENNACK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INDIA AND
PAKISTAN: U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (2003); see JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONG RESEARCH SERV.,
NUCLEAR SANCTIONS: SECTION 102(b) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT AND ITS APPLICATION TO
INDIA AND PAKISTAN (1999).
185. See, for example, the list of Congressional reporting requirements included in the Hyde
Act, 22 U.S.C.S. § 8003(c) (LexisNexis 2006).
186 See SQUASSONI, supra note 31, at 13. Of course, the United States would not be the only
country with responsibility for monitoring India. Other countries are now considering civil nuclear deals
of their own with India in anticipation of NSG approval. See, e.g., infra note 196.
187. It is debatable whether past U.S.-India cooperation has had this effect. One might argue
that the U.S.-India agreement regarding Tarapur spurred the United States to take more punitive actions
in response to India's 1974 test (imposing sanctions, passing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in 1978,
and initiating the Nuclear Suppliers Group). However, the short-lived nature of the U.S. sanctions points
in the opposite direction.
188. For more information on the PSI generally, see Richard T. Cupitt & Chris Jones, The
Proliferation Security Initiative: An Anti-Institution?, in NON-PROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROLS 197
(Daniel Joyner ed., 2006).
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control. 189 A reverse-engineered process, whereby India would join the PSI
and comply with NSG regulations as well as IAEA safeguards before (or
instead of) joining the NPT, may therefore not be a bad solution. 90 As India's
place in the world changes, gaining India's support for and participation in
these informal arrangements may even gradually move it closer to
disarmament or stockpile reduction.
9 1
IV. INFIRMITIES IN THE DEAL: TIMING, INCENTIVES, AND PERPETUITY
While the recent unraveling of the U.S.-India nuclear deal suggests that
domestic political pressures inherent in large democracies and coalition
politics led to the deal's threatened demise, 92 political forces do not operate
in a vacuum. 93 There are good reasons to believe that the deal's threatened
collapse is closely tied to the terms of the deal itself and the international
process through which it occurred. 194 Although neither India nor the United
States is likely to renegotiate the agreement, Congress will have another
opportunity to review the agreement before it becomes final. 195 Considering
how the deal might have been different-and how it might be supplemented in
189. See Warren Hoge, Iran Was Blocked From Buying Nuclear Materials At Least 74 Times,
Group Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, at A8 (describing how the NSG had prevented Iran from
making "purchases of nuclear-related materials at least 75 times over nine years").
190. Because amendments to the NPT must be approved by all existing parties to the Treaty,
there is little hope for change through this route. See M.J. Wilmshurst, Reforming the Non-Proliferation
Svstem in the 1980s, in THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AND
CHOICES 149 (John Simpson & Anthony G. McGrew eds., 1984). Other scholars have proposed
solutions that would make India, Israel, and Pakistan "accede to an additional protocol to the NPT,
obliging them to behave 'as if' they were members of the treaty." LODGAARD, supra note 145, at 5.
191. According to a 1994 survey, ninety-two percent of Indians surveyed "expressed total or
partial support for an international agreement to ban nuclear weapons," and thirty-nine percent of those
surveyed would support the NPT if Pakistan also agreed to sign it. David Cortright & Amitabh Mattoo,
Indian Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons Policy, in INDIA AND THE BOMB 3, 16 (David Cortright &
Ambitabh Mattoo eds., 1996). This study suggests that conditional assent to the NPT (or other
nonproliferation agreements) is not, at least politically speaking, out of the question for India over the
long run
192. Challenges to the deal emerged from opposition and coalition parties-particularly India's
Communist Party-which threatened early elections in response to the deal in a bid for increased power.
Somini Sengupta, In India's Coalition Math, Marxists' Power Is Magnified, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007,
at A3 (describing Communist Party "saber rattling" and the fact that "India's electoral math makes it
impossible for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's coalition government, which is led by the Congress
Party, to govern without the backing of its Communist allies"); see also Priya Sahgal, Cold Fusion,
INDIA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2007, at 25 (describing opposition to the deal in the Indian legislature, coming
from both the right and the left of the political spectrum). In particular, Indian political groups objected
to the Hyde Act's provisions regarding Indian cooperation on U.S. foreign policy vis-A-vis Iran and the
termination of U.S. cooperation in response to further Indian nuclear tests. For more on Indian
objections to the deal, see Weiss, supra note 68, at 444-45.
193. See Koh, supra note 105, at 2640-41 (explaining that international law is "a two-level
game, in which a member's relations with its treaty partners occur on an international chessboard, and
its bargaining about compliance with its internal domestic constituencies transpires on a domestic
chessboard").
194. See, e.g., infra Section III.A (descnbing the effects of the time lapse between the Hyde
Act and the 123 Agreement).
195. The U.S. Congress will have an opportunity to review the agreement before it enters into
force, assuming the deal receives NSG and IAEA approval. 22 U.S.C.S. § 8003(b)(2), (b)(7), (e)
(LexisNexis 2006). The U.S. Government has now set the clock running, stating that Congress must
have the deal back by May 2008 in order to approve it. Somini Sengupta, State Department Gives India
a Deadline for a Nuclear Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2008, at A6.
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the future-can guide our efforts as we consider future agreements and as
other countries conclude agreements of their own with India following NSG
approval. 196 This Part considers three weaknesses in the deal and how they
might be remedied.
A. Incentives
Since its inception, the United States and India have hailed the deal as
the "symbolic centerpiece" of the U.S.-India relationship. 197 Critics have
assailed it for the same reasons-alleging that it is merely symbolic and full of
empty promises. 198 There can be no doubt that while India faces an energy
crisis that the deal attempts to alleviate, 199 a significant benefit of the deal for
India is that it recognizes India's status as a global player and as an exception
to an international regime that it has long viewed as discriminatory.
200
Several provisions of the 123 Agreement therefore recognize India's
status as a de facto nuclear weapons state. The 123 Agreement states: "this
Agreement is between two States possessing advanced nuclear technology,
both Parties having the same benefits and advantages." 20 1 Rather than simply
stating that the IAEA safeguards will be "limited-scope safeguards," the
Agreement calls them "India-specific. 2 °2 The deal also implicitly recognizes
India's status as a de facto nuclear power in providing that the Agreement
"shall be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder ... any other activities
involving the use of ... military nuclear facilities." 20 3 As the government of
India publicly asserted following the release of the Agreement, "[n]owhere in
the bilateral agreement ... is testing mentioned." India therefore retains "the
sovereign right to test and would do so if it is necessary in national
interest."
20 4
196 France, for instance, has already begun to discuss its civil nuclear cooperation agreement
with India. Emmanuel Jarry, Sarkozy Seeks Civil Nuclear Deal with India, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 2008,
http://www.reuters com/article/newsone/idUSISL 16292120080125.
197. Burns, supra note 4.
198. See, e.g., McGoldrick, Bengelsdorf & Scheinman, supra note 68, at 8 (arguing that "a
voluntary safeguards agreement would be largely symbolic and is unlikely to yield meaningful
nonproliferation benefits"); Einhorn, supra note 94, at 2 (stating that the deal gave "the Indians virtually
all that they wanted" while "what the U.S. got from the deal was, for the most part, speculative-the
hope that a stronger partnership with India will pay strategic dividends down the road").
199. See generally GOV'T OF INDIA PLANNING COMM'N, INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY: REPORT
OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE (2006) (discussing India's energy needs and policy). However, critics allege
that expanding India's civil nuclear program will have, at best, a minimal impact on India's energy
supply. India PM Says US Nuclear Deal Not Dead, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 31, 2007 (on file
with author).
200 See, e.g., TALBOT'r, supra note 25, at 26 ("For many Indian politicians, government
officials, defense experts, and commentators, the NPT embodied 'the three D's' of U.S. nuclear
policy-dominance, discrimination, and double standards.").
201. 123 Agreement, supra note 17, pmbl.
202 Id. art. 5.
203. Id. art. 2.
204. Press Release, Ministry of External Affairs, supra note 102. Note that India borrows the
language of "rights" from the NPT. However, the NPT states: "Nothing in this Treaty shall be
interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination . NPT, supra
note 25, art. IV, I.
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The United States and India's asymmetrical interests in the deal create
problems of timing and incentives. As explained in Section II.D, the U.S.-
India deal is not premised on aligning incentives with nuclear interests. Once
India secured U.S. recognition of its nuclear status, it may have lost some of
its incentive to comply with the Agreement, since it had already realized its
symbolic benefits; indeed from the moment the deal was announced, India
displayed to the world that the United States was willing to recognize Indian
nuclear exceptionalism. 205 Perhaps it should not be surprising, then, that
despite having spent a great deal of political capital on reaching the
agreement, Prime Minister Singh retreated from the deal once it had been
206promulgated. The government of India reported that, during a conversation
to discuss the impending failure of the deal, Prime Minister Singh also spoke
to President Bush about India's position on agriculture in the Doha trade
talks.20 7 The fact that the deal provided the Prime Minister a direct channel to
the White House-which he could then use to discuss agricultural trade
protections (a high political priority for India)-may have been nearly as
politically beneficial to the Prime Minister as the conclusion of the deal
itself.20 8 Another explanation of the timing problem relates to the domestic
and international fora in which the deal unfolded. The finalization of the 123
Agreement following the passage of the Hyde Act created an opportunity for
cleavage between the two agreements. Having secured a U.S. commitment to
completing the deal-not to mention legislation authorizing it-Indian
politicians and commentators could seize on provisions of the Hyde Act that
they found unpalatable 20 9 and leverage these to bargain for more concessions
with the executive branch in the 123 Agreement.210
To partially remedy this problem of timing, incentives for future
compliance should have been incorporated into the deal. For instance, rather
than stating that "[s]ensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production
technology, [and] sensitive nuclear facilities ... may be transferred under this
Agreement pursuant to an amendment," 211 the Agreement could have
provided that such transfers would only be considered upon the completion of,
for example, fifteen years of successful trade between the two nations and
adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol.212
205. Cf Carter, supra note 121, at 34 (noting that "India obtained nuclear recognition up front"
but that "the gains for the United States are contingent and lie far ahead in the uncertain future").
206. See Andy Mukheijee, The Cost ofIndia's Nuclear U-Turn, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris),
Oct. 16, 2007, at 15. Indeed, Prime Minister Singh went from proclaiming, "I will let posterity judge the
value of what we have done," to announcing that "[firankly, the deal is not important." Id.
207. See, e.g., Ruth David, Singh Reckons U.S.-India Nuclear Deal on Ice, FORBES.COM,
Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/markets/2007/l0/16/india-nuclear-pact-markets-econ-cxrd_
1016markets03.html.
208. Indeed, "'[t]his (deal] is not an issue that is a vote winner in India; it is not a common
person's concern."' Ruth David, India Prime Minister Casts Doubt on Nuclear Agreement,
FORBES.COM, Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/2007/10/12/india-singh-nuclear-face-cx rd_
1015autofacscan02.html (quoting political analyst Mahesh Rangarajan).
209. See Weiss, supra note 68, at 444-45 (describing these provisions).
210. For an example of the problems this cleavage may have created, see infra note 227 and
accompanying text.
211. 123 Agreement, supra note 17, art 5(2).
212. Trade in sensitive technology for uranium enrichment is one area in which Congress and
the executive branch are in direct tension. The Hyde Act states that the United States will "work with
2008] Towards Common Interests and Responsibilities
To the extent that it is now too late to make such revisions to the deal
itself, the United States can take steps to explicitly tie the deal's successful
implementation to concrete benefits outside of the nuclear deal, such as
agricultural subsidies, visas for Indian workers, and opportunities for Indian
students to study in the United States. While these diversified incentives will
likely be part of the follow-on efforts the United States contemplates,
continuing to reference their connection to the deal as the lynchpin of U.S.-
India cooperation might make the deal more attractive to Indian voters (who
care more about educational and agricultural programs, in some cases, than
nuclear policy),21 3 accomplish both countries' goals of making the deal part of
a larger strategic relationship, and increase the costs of irresponsible nuclear
behavior.
B. Termination
The Agreement's provisions for termination are another potential weak
point. The Agreement specifies considerations that either party shall make
before terminating, but these provisions are so nebulous and broad that they
may provide an effective means of forestalling termination. 214 While the
Agreement incorporates a standard right of return of nuclear material
transferred pursuant to the Agreement in the event of termination, 215 Siddharth
Varadarajan explains that the right of return has been "so effectively boxed in
[by other provisions of the Agreement] as to render it harmless." 216 Even
assuming good will on India's part, one can imagine that it might be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to retrieve all of the nuclear materials
sold to India. 217 Notably, some other civil nuclear cooperation agreements,
members of the NSG, individually and collectively, to further restrict the transfers of such equipment
and technologies, including to India." 22 U.S C.S. § 8002(a)(5) (LexisNexis 2006). Other agreements
for civil nuclear cooperation, such as the U.S -Japan agreement of 1987, are not as lenient with regard to
the provision of sensitive nuclear technology. See Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government
of the United States of Amenca and the Government of Japan Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear
Energy, U.S.-Japan, art. 2(l)(b), Nov. 4, 1987, 1574 U.N.T.S 339 [hereinafter U.S-Japan Agreement].
213. See PERKOVICH, supra note 162, at 6 (noting that more than sixty percent of Indians
depend on agriculture to make a living). But see M R Snnivasan, Op-Ed., The Urgency of Concluding
the Nuclear Deal, HINDU (Chennai), Feb. 9, 2008, available at http://www.hindu.com/2008/02/09/
stories/2008020953531000.htm (arguing that "[it was a mistake for India to have parked the nuclear
agreement in an Indo-U.S strategic relationship").
214. See Siddharth Varadarajan, Op-Ed., Insulating India's Reactors from Fuel Disruption,
HINDU (Chennai), Aug. 8, 2007, available at http://www.hindu.com/2007/08/08/stories/
2007080855361200.htm. For example, the Agreement states that "the Parties shall consider the relevant
circumstances" and that "[i]f a Party seeking termination cites a violation of this Agreement as the
reason . the Parties shall consider whether the action was caused inadvertently or otherwise." 123
Agreement, supra note 17, art. 14(2)-(3). In contrast, the NPT states that a Party may withdraw from the
treaty if it decides that "extraordinary events ... have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country"
and that a withdrawing party "shall give notice of such withdrawal . . [which] shall include a statement
of the extraordinary events." NPT, supra note 25, art. X, 1.
215. 123 Agreement, supra note 17, art. 14(4). This is a standard provision. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 2153 (a)(4) (2000).
216. Varadarajan, supra note 214,
217. This is particularly true because the state calling for return must pay the "fair market value
thereof and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal." 123 Agreement, supra note 17,
art. 14(6). While other 123 agreements require payment of "fair market value," they do not require
payment for costs incurred. See, eg., U.S.-Japan Agreement, supra note 212, art. 12(5); Agreement
Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, U.S.-Bangl., art. 11(3), Sept. 17, 1981, 34 U.S.T. 63.
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218like the U.S.-Japan Agreement, provide for an arbitrator to settle disputes, a
provision the U.S.-India deal lacks.219
While the NPT also permits countries to withdraw unilaterally, 220 NPT
members are not likely to do so. By acceding to the Treaty, they have
foregone their ability to develop nuclear weapons. These countries are
therefore more dependent upon the international supply of civilian nuclear
materials to maintain their nuclear energy programs. India's termination of the
123 Agreement, on the other hand, would simply return it to the status quo,
since the deal does not require that India forgo any of its military nuclear
capabilities. Furthermore, the symbolic benefits of the deal for India would
not be negated by its withdrawal. Therefore, India has more incentives to
terminate or fail to comply with the deal than NPT member states.
Although the Hyde Act stipulates that several events may terminate the
Agreement, these are limited to serious breaches. For instance, the Act states
that exports will be terminated:
If there is any materially significant transfer by an Indian person of. (i) nuclear or
nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology that is not consistent with NSG
guidelines or decisions, or (ii) ballistic missiles .. that [are] not consistent with MTCR
[Missile Technology Control Regime] guidelines, unless the President determines that
cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United
States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and
221
security.
The Act further provides that the President may waive automatic termination
if such transfer was made without the government of India's knowledge or
control over the transferring person, and if the President assures Congress that
India is taking appropriate actions in response.22 2 The only circumstance in
which the President cannot waive automatic termination is when the
"President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device.'
223
While the Hyde Act's termination triggers are a necessary aspect of the
Agreement (since the 123 Agreement itself does not incorporate these
provisions), other triggers could also be built into the Agreement wherein less
significant breaches, would trigger temporary cessation or imposition of more
extensive safeguards. Although such conditional measures would undoubtedly
make the deal less attractive to Indian constituents, the NSG might include
some of these conditions as part of its approval of the Indian exemption.
Further, the Agreement cautions that exercising the right of return "would have profound implications
for ... relations," 123 Agreement, supra note 17, art. 14(5), a provision that is unique to the U.S.-India
Agreement. Wade Boese, U.S. Indian Nuclear Deal Advances, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 2007, at
22, 23.
218. U.S,-Japan Agreement, supra note 212, art. 14 (making detailed provisions for appointing
an arbitral tribunal and remedial provisions that allow either party to request the President of the
International Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator if the other party fails to do so). This is not to
imply, however, that this is a common feature of 123 Agreements.
219. 123 Agreement, supra note 17, art. 15 (providing that disputes "shall be promptly
negotiated by the Parties").
220. NPT, supra note 25, art. X.
221. 22 U.S C.S. § 8003(d)(3)(A)(ii) (LexisNexis 2006).
222. § 8003(d)(3)(B).
223. § 8005.
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C. Perpetuity
The deal's promise of perpetuity 224 highlights a third potentially
problematic aspect of the deal, namely, how provisions of the Agreement will
fare should either country terminate the deal. The 123 Agreement provides
that several articles (pertaining to the imposition of India-specific IAEA
safeguards, nuclear fuel cycle activities, storage and retransfers, physical
protection of nuclear materials, and peaceful use) will remain in effect
notwithstanding termination. 225 India would ostensibly continue to submit to
IAEA safeguards even if the United States terminated the Agreement in order
to continue trading with third-party countries. Yet one article in particular
poses difficult questions for the United States. Article 5 of the 123 Agreement
states that the India-specific safeguards will "provid[e] for corrective
measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian
nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies" without
defining what these "corrective measures" include. 226 Moreover, the
Agreement represents that, even should it terminate, the United States will
"convene a group of friendly supplier countries.., to pursue such measures
as would restore fuel supply to India" in the event of a supply disruption.
227
This provision, possible aimed at assuring India that U.S. legislative action
will not interfere with the fuel supply assurances in the 123 Agreement forged
by the administration, may lead to conflict down the road between the U.S.
Congress and the executive branch.
Presumably, the India-specific IAEA protocols and the NSG's approval
will contain mechanisms for future enforcement that would apply even if the
U.S.-India Agreement were to terminate. Although India has stated that it does
not want (and may not accept) anything other than a "clean exemption" from
228the NSG, some additional conditions imposed by the NSG might be
palatable to India. These conditions might strengthen the deal by requiring, for
instance, that India take certain disarmament measures. Such assurances
would also make the U.S.-India deal more reflective of the spirit of the
international nonproliferation regime.
Another way of securing the deal's promises in perpetuity, and linking
the deal to the broader NPT framework, is to use the deal as a catalyst for
action aimed at reducing global fissile material production. As part of the
Agreement, the United States and India pledged to work towards the
"conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty.' 229 In light of
the slow progress on this Treaty to date, the United States should seek
assurances that India will begin to reduce-with an eye towards ultimately
224. Rice, supra note 20 ("Once a reactor is under IAEA oversight, safeguards will be in place
permanently .. "); see 123 Agreement, supra note 17, art. 16(3).
225. 123 Agreement, supra note 17, art. 16(3).
226. Id. art. 5(6)(c).
227. Id. art. 5(6)(b)(iv).
228. We Want Clean NSG Exemption: Kakodkar, HINDU (Chennai), Feb. 21, 2008, available at
http://www.thehindu.com2008/02/21/stories/2008022159851300.htm.
229. Joint Statement, supra note 35. Such a treaty, proposed by President Clinton in 1993 but
not yet concluded, would end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
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terminating-its production of fissile material, as the United States, United
Kingdom, Russia, France, and China have informally done.
2 30
V. CONCLUSION
Examining the U.S.-India deal's impact on the NPT regime reveals the
precise ways in which the deal may-or may not-pose risks to that system.
Critics bristle at the deal as an example of the United States picking favorites
and separating the "good guys" from the bad-condemning North Korea
while cajoling India and creating exceptions, in effect, for its anointed . 3' This
is not, they argue, the comprehensive solution to nonproliferation that we
need. Yet one can see in this agreement an approach to nonproliferation that is
comprehensive in another regard. Many of today's transnational problems,
particularly nuclear terrorism, require cooperation that spans topical areas-
from nuclear security, to military policy, to internal policing and legal
reforms. Yet the international institutions and treaty regimes that grew up
following World War II were designed to operate topically. 232 Broader
bilateral arrangements that trade strategic benefits (in this instance) for nuclear
ones may be an important part of addressing a new and complex environment
in which transnational problems are increasingly cross-disciplinary and,
therefore, not easily addressed by existing international regimes.
The U.S.-India civil nuclear deal has arisen to confront a reality and
address a particular need: India will not accede to the NPT though it is a
nuclear weapons state; India needs nuclear power and will develop it with or
without the United States. Contrary to some critics' arguments, devising a
more flexible mechanism for addressing these twin realities may strengthen
international nonproliferation efforts and, ultimately, the regime itself. While
the deal is imperfect as drafted, this Note suggests that there may be remedies
for several of its problematic aspects. At its core, the deal is-and can be
made more-consistent with our commitment to nonproliferation.
230. While Prime Minister Singh has indicated that India will not accept a moratorium on
fissile material production, Weiss, supra note 68, at 445, assurances that India will begin to reduce its
production would be a major step forward. The United States can also use its congressional reporting
requirements, see supra text accompanying note 128, to give India incentives not to use the agreement to
step up its fissile material production for weapons See LEVI & FERGUSON, supra note 129, at 20-22.
231. See Krepon, supra note 162.
232. "Political conflict, for example, was to be regulated by the United Nations... Destructive
economic conflicts ... were to be mitigated through the Bretton Woods system ... Koh, supra note
105, at 2614.
